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Symposium 
Conservative and Libertarian Reactions to the 
Obama Administration 
OBAMA'S CONSTITUTION: THE PASSIVE 
VIRTUES WRIT LARGE 
Richard A. Epstein* 
THE FADING OBAMA MYSTIQUE 
There is little doubt today about Barack Obama's political 
orientation. He is a man of the Left. Yet in the fall of 2008, 
during the height of the Presidential Election, there were endless 
debates as to whether Obama counted as a political moderate 
who understood that it was necessary to govern from the center 
or whether he a strong left-of-center politician who had 
mastered the lesson that radical politicians had to present 
themselves in a way that went against type. The standard 
political economy story that had some currency at the time was 
that he would turn out to be a moderate on the grounds that all 
presidential nominees move to court the median voter. That 
impression was reinforced by his choice of advisors, many of 
whom like Lawrence Summers, were retooled Clintonites who 
were thought to be on the conservative wing of the Democratic 
Party. And most powerfully, that image was reinforced by his 
evident rhetorical elegance, his nice blue ties and his calm 
demeanor. Taken together, his presentation of self was an 
effective means to disarm those critics who insisted that his 
politics put him, as his voting record suggested, to the left of 
center of the American legal system. 
It is this studied ambiguity that makes Obama so hard to 
read. It is instructive that in the fall of 2008 many people asked 
whether Obama counted as a socialist-a question that needed 
(and still needs) a nuanced answer. Obama did not, and does not 
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believe, in the government ownership over the means of 
production. What he believes in is the extensive regulation by 
government of the private firms that are responsible for 
production. which may be achieved by any and all methods that 
are available to a President and the Congress: taxes, mandates. 
regulations. subsidies. The hard question is just how far he is 
prepared to push on these levers of government power. WelL 
that debate is over. As one centrist democrat put it to me, 
ruefully, "we were both wrong. Obama is surely to the left of 
where I thought he would be. But then again he is to the left of 
where you thought he would be as well." I am not quite sure that 
the last half of this observation is true. but without question he 
has sought to move the ratio of public to private expenditures 
and influence harder and faster on more issues than any 
president in recent years. He is in favor of market liberalization 
on issues like medical marijuana and stem cell research, but 
otherwise his mindset is quite clear. The defects that we have in 
the current situation all stem from too little government 
regulation not from too much. He sees the health care system as 
one in which private insurance markets have failed; the global 
warming issue as one in which massive restrictions on emissions 
are needed; the labor markets as suffering from declining real 
income because of a want of effective union organization; 
financial markets as failing because of greedy bankers and weak 
and divided oversight. And so on down the line. 
Sadly his rhetoric has become more strident and less 
coherent since the Democratic Party lost the Senate seat in 
Massachusetts. in what counts as one of the most stunning 
reversals in political fortune ever in the United States. Rather 
than mend his ways, bashing the banks has become the current 
fixation. in the hope that the antagonism toward Wall Street will 
allow him to pick up Republican support for showing that he is 
made of sterner stuff, even if that means saddling the banks with 
a set of punitive regulations and taxes. which will only further set 
back the economy. 
But, it will be asked, how deep are his convictions? On this 
point. the issue is complicated to say the least. It is common 
knowledge today that Obama now faces deep resentment from 
the left-wing of the Democratic Party that is, if anything, further 
to the left than he is. The issue. which at one time was confined 
to blogs on the Left, has now become grist for the mainstream 
press. To many of these people he is an ineffective compromiser, 
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under the unprincipled spell of Rahm EmanueL who does not 
see the imperative need to take over the healthcare system root 
and branch and, for all I know. nationalize the banks as well. 
Obama 's realist side makes one appreciate just how difficult it is 
to govern from the center. when the dispersion of political 
sentiment in the nation are greater than they have ever been. My 
own sense is that Obama does not disagree in principle with 
these critiques, but senses. however vaguely. that he cannot 
possibly win reelection if he caters to exclusively his own 
political base. So his strategy has been to engage in a go-slow 
attitude that seeks to buy off some of his major opponents-the 
pharmaceutical industry, the insurance industry-with well-
timed, but inelegant compromises. For the purists in his party, 
that willingness of compromise with the devil counts as a form of 
political treason. For a working politician. it counts as first step 
in political survival. 
Yet note that this is a debate about tactics, and not about 
principles. There is a question of whether Obama has any 
principles. To the response that he does not, I can only say that I 
think that his political instincts are deep, and are consistent with 
the arc of his life. The origins of his belief system date back long 
before he took up golf. His views I think were formed during his 
college and law school years. They were strengthened by his 
years in Chicago, where Obama never worked in any trade or 
business, but was always a political organizer who learned to 
form, when appropriate, alliances with business figures. His stint 
at the University of Chicago Law School only strengthened his 
earlier tendencies. Obama taught one portion of constitutional 
law (race, due process and equal protection) for many years. His 
teaching was effective, but left no intellectual footprint, for he 
had none to leave. Indeed, there is little evidence from the 
twelve or so years that we overlapped at the University of 
Chicago that he thought hard about the current issues of health, 
environment, labor and financial legislation that are the 
centerpieces of his legislative program. Certainly, he had little or 
no engagement with either conservative of libertarian thought 
during his years as a senior lecturer. Then, as now. he was more 
comfortable in the company of allies than critics. 
I do not regard this as a new revelation. During his 
successful campaign, I spoke out against the conventional 
wisdom and questioned as well Hyde Park's adoration of its 
most prominent first citizen. I took the position. based on a 
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combination of personal knowledge and public pronouncements, 
that Obama was a man of the Left who said what he meant, and 
after a fashion meant what he had said. One of my reasons was 
so simple that even a cynic could approve. With evident 
trepidation, I read the Platform for the Democratic Party in 
2008, "Renewing America's Promise"1 and concluded that it 
showed not the slightest awareness that some principled 
limitations had to be placed on the government's power to tax 
and to regulate. Its constant calls for instant action -Affordable 
Health Care for All Americans-were to my mind not just 
campaign rhetoric. They contained the seeds of the destruction 
that eventually resulted in the shipwreck of the Democratic 
healthcare reform efforts. It is not possible to increase access 
and control costs at the same time-this platform gave a 
powerful indication of the extent to which Obama had departed 
from the moderately centrist strategy that Bill Clinton took on, 
at least after the Republicans gained control of the Congress in 
1994. There are no such corrections in the offing here. 
FROM POLITICAL MYSTIQUE TO JUDICIAL 
NOMINATIONS 
The strong emphasis of legislative transformation shows in 
his attitude toward the federal courts. The big story about the 
Obama administration on the legal front is how little it seems to 
care about the judicial nominations or the judicial process in 
general. His rate of nominations has been slow and the rate of 
conformations has been even slower. As Jonathan Adler has 
noted in his blog on the Volokh Conspiracy,2 the explanation 
could be that judicial nominations are pushed to the rear 
because of the other major items on the agenda. In the 
alternative, there are process explanations. One possibility is 
that Obama-who has shown no distaste for executive power-
has centralized too much of the process in the White House, has 
engaged in a vetting process that drives away competent people 
from the White House, or has been overwhelmed by resistance 
in the Senate, including individual holds on particular nominees. 
1. See http://www.democrats.org/a/party/platform.html. 
2. Jonathan Adler, Where Are Obama's Judicial Nominees?. October 18. 2009. 
available at file:///Documents/ Articles/Obama %20and %20the %20Constitutionl ADler% 
20on% 20nonminations. webarchi ve. 
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Obama did. of course. preside over a full-court press to 
appoint then-judge Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court. The 
opposition to her from the Republican side talked in part about 
her extracurricular work for La Raza and other Latino and 
Latina groups. Most of that criticism did not amount to a hill of 
beans if only because pointless claims of that sort are common in 
conference settings. Indeed. the best line of her mostly drab 
confirmation hearings was her bittersweet observation that her 
invocation of a "wise Latina woman" did not go down well even 
before a sympathetic audience, which is probably all for the 
better. 
What matters more was her view on judicial behavior. It 
was quite clear that during the hearing she did not voice any 
radical views on her future role on the bench. Instead, she 
contented herself with saying that judges interpret and do not 
make laws. and she would be bound by the legal tradition of 
which she is a part. To the left this was an implicit rejection of 
the "living constitution." To the right it was belated recognition 
that its brand of originalism deserved greater respect than it 
received. Yet working at this level of generality tells us very 
little. In the few decisions of late, she has sided with the liberal 
bloc, most notably in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission.' Prior to her elevation to the Supreme Court much 
of her work was regarded as solid and sensible by most 
observers. Indeed, she was (rightly) castigated for her views on 
two key cases. only one of which reached the Supreme Court. 
These two decisions may give some hint as to her future 
performance on the Supreme Court. 
The first of these was Didden v. Village of Port Chester.~ 
which took an astonishingly casual view, even by the lax 
standards of Kelo v. City of New London,' toward the public use 
limitation found in the takings clause to the Constitution. Kelo 
was notorious insofar as it sanctioned a taking of private 
property for redevelopment by another private party solely for 
purposes of economic development. The proposed New London 
plan was an economic farce from the outset, and the land still 
stands vacant over four and one-half years after the decision 
came down. But bad as Keto was on the textual foundation it 
3. 130 S. Ct. X76 (2010). 
4. 173 Fed. Appx. 931 (2d Cir. 2006). 
5. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
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was not wholly unprincipled. It rested on the assumption that 
there was an outer limit to the public use test that prohibited any 
outright transfer from A to B that was not sanctioned by 
extensive and inclusive public hearings and deliberation. When 
the political process was working, the political blessing provided 
an appropriate answer to the public use question that survived 
judicial review. 
In contrast Didden involved no public hearings or 
deliberations. The Town of Port Chester had placed one Greg 
Wasser in charge of new development for the entire town, and 
he unilaterally informed Didden that he would condemn the 
property for his own use unless the independent developer gave 
him a large cash payment or a piece of the project for free. There 
was no public process at all, except for a decision of the Village 
to rubber stamp Wasser's request. What was needed was some 
serious discussion of the limits of Kelo. What was given was a per 
curiam opinion. which Sotomayor joined, that was so cursory it 
was hard to believe that she took the matter seriously at all. 
Her second major gaffe involved affirmative action where, 
in another per curiam opinion in Ricci v. deStefano,6 she 
essentially gave the New Haven local government carte blanche 
to disregard the elaborate system put in place to deal with the 
promotion of firefighters on the ground that it could have 
contained some measure of bias, given the disproportionate 
outcomes on the standardized tests. Her decision was overturned 
by the usual five-four conservative-liberal split, but what was 
most instructive was that even the decision of the four dissenters, 
led by Justice Ginsburg, would have required that New Haven 
make out some good faith or for-cause showing as to why it 
disregarded the results of the tests; this was more restrictive than 
Sotomayor's decision, which gave New Haven a free pass on the 
question. 7 
To these two cases, it is possible to add a third high profile 
case. Maloney v Cuomo,x which skirted the question of whether 
the Second Amendment protection of the right to bear and keep 
arms bound the states. Maloney never addressed incorporation 
but rested on a reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, but applied a rational basis test to 
6. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). 
7. !d. 
8. 554 F.3d 556 (2d Cir 2009). 
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the issue, and found the statute, banning the use of nunchukos, 
constitutional. Maloney was decided after the Supreme Court's 
game-changing decision in District of Columbia v. Heller,9 which 
contained explicit language by Justice Scalia that required the 
District to meet something more than the rational basis test in 
order to sustain the statute. 10 But Maloney regarded the matter 
as one for rational basis analysis under the privileges or 
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which is, I 
think, the one position that is clearly wrong.11 
There is a common thread that runs through these three 
decisions. All of them adopted the hands-off rational basis point 
perspective to the occult art of constitutional interpretation. 
That is precisely what Obama wants in a Supreme Court Justice. 
The essence of rational basis interpretation lies in its strong 
presumptive acceptance of the legislative will, which is 
disregarded only when no conceivable rationale for the decision 
may be advanced. Complex legislation always involves difficult 
tradeoffs, so that it is hard to find anything that passes that is so 
conspicuously depraved that nothing can be said on its behalf, 
especially by the interest group that championed its adoption. If 
the standard is that the statute or executive action should pass 
muster if it generates some discrete benefit to some group of 
individuals, regardless of costs to others, the game is over. 
Here's why. No statute will gain passage if it leaves 
everyone worse off. So long as it is possible to dress up the 
legislation with some fancy rationale, it will pass. Or to put it 
otherwise, there has long been some talk that mere "naked 
preferences" show a "raw" form of political power that requires 
them to be struck down. 12 But it is easy to dress up preferences 
by showing that some group of individuals is given release 
against rising prices, or is it, falling prices, or is it price 
stagnation? No matter, there is always some evil to combat. 
Given this frame of mind, the standard of review becomes 
so overpowering that the substantive issue scarcely matters. The 
three Sotomayor cases just mentioned deal with issues that could 
not be further apart: property rights, affirmative action, and 
9. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
10. Heller 128 S. Ct .. at 2817n.27. 
11. See Richard A. Epstein. Does the Second Amendment Bind Frank 
Easterbrook?. 77 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010). 
12. See. Cass R. Sunstein. ,'Vaked Preferences and the Constillltion. 84 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1689 (1984). . 
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guns. But the rational basis test flattens the substantive issues; it 
ignores the textual differences; and it turns substantive 
differences into mere details in the grand scheme of things. The 
rational basis test inverts the original design of the Constitution. 
No longer is government to be regarded as a necessary evil with 
limited powers. It is to be regarded as a welcome manifestation 
of the popular will. The duty of judges may not be to celebrate 
these statutes, although they often do. But it is at the very least 
to defer to the outcomes of the political branches, not to resist 
them. 
It is worth noting, moreover, that this orientation is not 
unique to Democrats. Republicans take the same attitude when 
it comes to state intervention on issues of personal liberty to 
which Democrats (rightly) take a small government attitude, 
such as the use of medical marijuana, which provoked yet 
another strong pro government decision in Gonzales v. Raich. 13 
The Obama administration may dislike this decision on the 
merits, but it need not play any constitutional trump card. It can 
simply announce that it will respect the right of any state to 
administer its own medical marijuana law. The substantive 
approach of the two parties is far apart, but at least on the 
constitutional issues, the Democratic Party has few desires to 
advance its own political agenda through constitutional 
litigation, even if it has no desire to back down on cases such as 
Roe v. Wade, which set the agenda 36 years ago. 
Against this background, it is clear how the Sotomayor 
appointment and her jurisprudence fit with the Obama game 
plan for the courts. She is willing to cut him a lot of slack in the 
political space. It is equally clear that he was not troubled by the 
fact that her background also contains clear conservative 
elements. Her litigation experience in private practice centered 
on commercial law and intellectual property. It remains to be 
seen whether this will influence how she thinks about these 
questions. Her public service was in the prosecutor's office. Her 
life story speaks of a woman who made a personal odyssey that 
started in the projects, went from Princeton to Yale, to the 
corridors of power. But the constitutional attitude of deference 
on all new initiatives that come within her purview is consistent 
with the larger Obama approach. His ambitious agenda depends 
on judges who are prepared to stand off to one side, by rejecting 
13. 545 u.s. 1 (2005). 
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all the arguments raised against his government programs, many 
of which rely on unprecedented levels of government coercion. 
And those attacks will come on both grounds of federalism 
and individual rights. Some of these attacks will be odd to say 
the least. Before the legislation cratered, there were many 
efforts to announce that national healthcare legislation is 
unconstitutional on the grounds that physician-patient relations 
are local matters that are outside the reach of the Commerce 
Clause. The argument was that individual autonomy was 
overridden by this new intrusion of the federal government. I 
disliked the earlier healthcare bill as much anyone but thought 
that the strongest constitutional argument against it was that it 
treated the private insurers as regulated public utilities who, at 
the end of the day, could not earn a sufficient rate of return to 
remain in business. 14 But the Commerce Clause argument 
mistakenly cast the autonomy issue as a federalism issue when it 
is in fact one about individual entitlements against government, 
which should be as powerful against state action as against 
federal action. Structured as a commerce clause argument it will 
not, and, under current law, should not win a single vote at any 
level of the judicial system. 
The coercive nature of the current legislative program does 
mean, however, that the attacks on the Obama program based 
on individual rights could stand an outside chance of success. 
The requirement that individuals take out insurance that works 
against their own interest, or pay a tax if they choose not to, 
raises the level of government coercion to new heights. There is 
a respectable argument at least that this measure of coercion 
represents a denial of liberty or the loss of private property or 
both. But so long as a rational basis test gives lots of running 
room for political actors, it does not matter what theory is raised 
against a new major program. Program survives, attack fails: end 
of story. 
14. See Impermissible Ra!emaking in Health-Insurance Reform: Why the Reid Bill 
is UnconsTitutional, Medical Progress Today (Manhattan Institute) http://www. 
medicalprogresstoday.com/enewslet ters/mpt_ind. php?pid= 1834&nid=250 and 
at Point of Law.com. http://www.pointoflaw.com/columns/archives/2009/12/ 
impermissible-ratemaking-in-he.php. For the shorter version. see Richard A. 
Epstein. Harry Reid Turns Insurance Into a Public Utility. available at 
h ttp://online. wsj .com/ article/SB I 0001424052 7 4870430450457 4610040924143158. 
html 0 mod=rss_opinion_main. 
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The same could, and should, be said of another piece of 
dormant legislation, the Employee Free Choice Act, whose 
major provisions allow for card check to displace union 
elections, and forces the employer into a binding two-year 
"contract," without judicial review from an arbitral panel 
appointed by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Board 
housed in the Obama Department of Labor. 15 The coercive 
power of the state is nightmarish in its implication if it can force 
people to enter into losing transactions. But once again, the 
rational basis might well be made to work its magic in these 
contexts, precisely because it is not bound by any traditional 
coinception of individual justice. Recall, for example, that we 
have on the books many examples of government power that 
offends the usual principles of justice, including retroactive taxes 
that look like takings as well. 16 But there is an upward fight on 
this issue because the Supreme Court has said on more than one 
occasion that an appeal to settled expectations has no traction as 
a constitutional principle. Today there is an increasing disquiet 
in conservative circles about the unbounded possibilities of 
coercive legislation. More to the point, there is a willingness on 
the part of some judges to make creative judicial arguments to 
escape from past precedent. 
One recent decision in this vein is Guggenheim v. City of 
Goleta,17 where the question was whether Goleta's rent 
stabilization law ran afoul of the takings clause. Like all rent 
stabilization statutes, Goleta used a formula that set the rent at 
which mobile home owners could occupy for their exclusive 
benefit land owned by other individuals. As is the case with all 
rent control statutes, the owner of the "pad" could not evict a 
tenant at the expiration of the lease, but was required to renew 
the lease on disadvantageous terms, except in a few cases where 
termination was for cause, e.g. nonpayment of rent. Worse still, 
the owner who sold the pad could sell along with it the right to 
remain on the premise. The net effect is that the sale price for 
the RV embedded the future discounted value for the pad. 
15. For mv discussion. see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN. THE CASE AGAINST THE 
btPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT 157-74 (2009). 
16. See, e.g .. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn. 428 U.S. 1 (1976). 
17. 582 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2009). For my extended comments. see Richard A. 
Epstein. Takings Law Made Hard. REGULATION 4 (Winter 2009-2010), available at 
http://www .cato.org/pubs/regulation!re gv32n4/v32n4-1. pdf. 
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When Justice O'Connor was faced with a physical takings 
challenge on this arrangement in Yee v. City of Escondido. 1' she 
reached the incredible conclusion that there was no physical 
taking because the landowner had let the mobile home owner 
onto the property. Permit entry for a year and it is as if you have 
allowed entry for an indefinite term. 1 ~ The pad owner in that case 
did not press the regulatory takings issue, so once the physical 
taking claim was rebuffed the case was at an end. Undeterred. 
Jay Bybee in the Ninth Circuit cut through the doctrinal thicket 
that came his way, and held that the entire statute was amenable 
to a facial challenge because it operated as a per se regulatory 
taking. It was only fitting irony that it cited the Sunstein article. 
noted above, that spoke about naked preferences in support of a 
conclusion that cut pretty much in the opposite direction. 
There is a sobering lesson here. The same types of judicial 
machinations that have long been used on behalf of liberal 
causes are available to conservative judges as well. The Obama 
administration wants and needs judges who will not be party to 
those maneuvers. But otherwise it has little to gain from seeking 
judges who think that it is their job to move the ball forward. 
That is not true, however, for the conservatives who fear liberal 
judges in part because they will not reverse the current 
constitutional status quo. Needless to say, these same 
conservatives also fear liberal judges for their potential decisions 
in a raft of mid level statutory and common law claims that do 
not go to ultimate constitutional issues that impact the Obama 
agenda. Obama clearly cares about these second level issues. as 
well he should, but for him the key question is how high they 
stand on the overall agenda. With the debacle of the health care 
bill and the renewed emphasis of job creation. we know the 
answer to that question: not as high as his big ticket items on the 
legislative front. So in a world of limited resources. and in his 
case, diminished political capital, nominations for appeals court 
and district court take a back seat. The powder is. I suspect. 
being kept dry for the nomination of a replacement for Justice 
Stevens, Justice Ginsburg or both. But the twists and turns in 
particular cases should be allowed to obscure the basic point that 
on high-stakes constitutional issue, Obama wants judges who 
preserve the status quo. not those with a sense of intellectual 
18. 503 U.S. 519 (1992). 
19. /d. at 529-30. 
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adventure and excitement. For this he needs a cooperative 
Supreme Court. If that court is to have any bold spirit, it will be 
to overrule decisions that place a crimp in the power of the 
federal government to do as it will. United States v. Lopei0 is an 
obvious target on the Commerce Clause. even though it has 
been completely contained by subsequent Supreme Court and 
lower court opinions. What he must hope for is the surprise 
resignation of a conservative justice, which would lead surely 
allow a liberal appointment that could undo what little remains 
of Lopez. An old Chinese curse says "May you live in interesting 
times." Court lovers and court haters always find themselves in 
that unenviable position. 
20. 516 U.S. 549 (1995). 
